We present a precise definition of ca us e and eff ect in terms of a fu ndamental notion called un responsiveness. Our definition is based on Savage's (1954 ) form ulation of decision the ory and departs from the traditional view of ca usation in that ou r ca usal assertions are made relative to a set of decisions. An im portant conseq ue nce of this depart ur e is that we can reason abo ut ca use locally, not re qu iring a ca us al explanation for every depen dency. Su ch local reasoning can be beneficial beca use it may not be necessary to determine whether a partic ular dependency is ca us al to make a decision. Also in this paper, we ex amine the graphical encoding of ca us al rela tionships. We show that infl ue nce diagrams in canonical form are an acc ur ate and effi cient representation of ca usal relationships. In addition, we establish a correspondence between canonical form and Pearl's ca usal theory.
Introduction
Mo st traditional models of un certainty, incl ud ing Ma rkov networks (La uritzen, 1982 ) and Bayesian net works (Pearl, 1988) have foc used on the associational relationship among variables as capt ur ed by condi tional independence and dependence. Associational knowledge, however, is not su fficient when we want to make decisions un der un certainty. For example, al though we know that smoking and lu ng cancer are probabilistically dependent, we cannot concl ude from this knowledge that we will decrease ou r chances of getting lu ng cancer if we stop smoking. In general, to Ross Shachter De partment of Engineering-Economic Systems Stanford, CA 943 05-4025 shachter@camis.stanford.ed u make rational decisions, we need to be able to predict the eff ects of ou r actions.
Recent work by Artif i cial Intelligence researchers, statisticians, and philosophers-for example, Pearl and Verma (1991 ) , Dr uz dzel and Simon ( 1993 ) , and Spirtes et al. (1993 ) -have emphasized the impor tance of identifying ca us al relationships for pu rposes of modeling the eff ects of intervention. They arg ue, for example, that if we believe that smoking ca uses lu ng cancer, then we believe that ou r choice whether to contin ue or qu it smoking can aff ect whether we get lu ng cancer . In contrast, if we believe that smoking does not ca us e lu ng cancer, ou r choice will not aff ect whether we get lu ng cancer, and the observed corre lation between smoking and lu ng cancer co uld be ex plained perhaps by a common ca us e of both ( e.g., a genetic predisposition toward cancer and the desire to smoke ), which we are un able to control.
This recent work has led to signif i cant breakthro ug hs in ca us al reasoning. For example, Pearl and Verma { 1991 ) and Spirtes et al. (1993 ) have shown how ca usal knowledge represented graphically can be us ed to pre dict the eff ects of interventions and how observational data can be us ed to su ggest ca us al relationships, and Pearl (1995) has shown how, given a qu alitative ca usal str uct ure, the qu antitative eff ects of intervention may be estimated from observational data alone in some sit ua tions.
In this paper, we off er three improvements to the cu r rent work in ca usal reasoning. First, the cu rrent ap proaches either take ca usality as a primitive notion, or provide only a fu zzy, int ui tive def i nition of ca use and eff ect. For example, in the introd uc tion of their book on ca us ation, Spirtes et al. (1993, p. 42) 
write:
We un derstand ca us ation to be a relation be tween partic ular events: something happens and ca us es something else to happen. Each ca use is a partic ul ar event and each eff ect is a partic ul ar event. An event A can have more than one ca us e, none of which alone su ffice to prod uce A. An event A can also be overde-termined: it can have more than one set of ca us es that su ffice for A to occ ur . We as su me that ca usation is transitive, irref l exive, and antisymmetric.
In this paper, we offer a def i nition of ca us ation in terms of a more fu ndamental relation that we call un respon siveness. Our def i nition is precise, and can be us ed as an assessment aid when someone is having tro uble determining whether or not a relationship is ca us al. Also, ou r def i nition can help people acc ur ately com mu nicate their beliefs abo ut ca us al relationships. In addition, the definition facilitates the development of techniq ue s for learning ca us al relationships from data (Beckerman, this proceedings ).
Second, the cu rrent approaches req ui re all relation ships to be ca us al. That is, for any two probabilisti cally dependent events or variables x and y in a given domain, these methods req ui re a us er to assert either that x ca us es y, y ca uses x, or they are linked by a chain of ca us al relationships, su ch as when x and y share a common ca use, or x and y are common ca us es of an observed variable. For example, Pearl and Verma's (1991) ca usal model is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) , wherein every node corresponds to a variable and every arc from nodes x to y corresponds to the assertion that x is a direct ca use of y. When us ing a ca usal model to represent a domain, a ca us al explana tions mu st hold for every dependency in the domain. Our def i nition of ca us ation is local in that it does not req ui re all relationships to be ca usal. This property can be advantageo us when making decisions. Namely, given a partic ul ar decision problem, there may be no need to assign a ca us al explanation to all dependencies in the domain in order to determine a rational co urse of action. Conseq uently, ou r definition may enable a decision maker to reason more efficiently.
Third, we describe a special condition on an infl ue nce diagram known as canonical form and show how it can be us ed to represent ca us al relationships more ef f i ciently than existing representations.
Our approach is consistent with several cu rrent meth ods for reasoning abo ut ca usality, incl uding Pearl's ca us al theory (Pearl and Verma, 1991; Pearl, 1995) and ca us al networks of Spirtes et al. (1993 ) . In ad dition, ou r approach is consistent with the philosophy of decision analysis as described by Savage (1954 ) and refined by Howard (1990) . Th us , ou r disc ussions here offer a means by which the two disciplines may begin to comm unicate and contrib ute to each other's work. This paper is a seq ue l to that presented at last year's conference (Beckerman and Shachter, 1994 ) . Here, we clarify and generalize many of the concepts in the pre vio us paper, incl ud ing those of un responsiveness ( f or merly disc us sed in terms of f i xed sets ), mapping vari able, ca use, set decision, and canonical form. 
Unresponsiveness
In this section, we introd uc e the notions of un respon siveness and limited un responsiveness, fu ndamental re lations un derlying ca usation.
Important to ou r disc us sion are several distinctions from classical decision theory as described by Savage (1954 ) . In partic ul ar, we disting ui sh between alterna tives (w hat Savage called "acts" ), realizations (w hat Savage called "conseq ue nces" ), and possible states of the world.1 Savage describes and ill us trates these con cepts as follows:
To say that a decision is to be made is to say that one or more ( Consider an example. Yo ur wife has just broken f i ve good eggs into a bowl when yo u come in and vol un teer to finish making the omelet. A sixth egg, which for some rea son mu st either be us ed for the omelet or wasted altogether, lies un broken beside the bowl. Yo u mu st decide what to do with this un broken egg. Perhaps it is not too great an oversimplif i cation to say that yo u mu st de cide among three [ a lternatives ] only, namely, to break it into the bowl containing the other five, to break it into a sa uc er for inspection, or to throw it away witho ut inspection. De pending on the state of the egg, each of these three [ a lternatives ] will have some [realiza tion ] of concern to yo u, say that indicated by Ta ble 1.
For pu rposes of ou r disc us sion, there are two points to emphasize from Savage's exposition. First, it is im portant to disting ui sh between that which we can con trol directly-namely, alternatives-and that which we can control only indirectly thro ug h choosing an alternative-namely, realizations. Second, once we choose an alternative, the realization that occ urs is log ically determined by the state of the world. Of co ur se, this realization can be ( a nd us ua lly is ) un certain, be ca use the state of the world is un certain.
1 We use the term "alternative" in place of "act", be cause the former is more commonly used today. We use the term "realization" in place of "consequence" because it avoids the connotation that we should necessarily care about a realization. That is, we often want to model re alizations, even though we don't directly care about them. In using different terms for these concepts, however, we do not intend to change their meanings. saucer to wash omelet'f3 (o), having instances "zero," "five," and "six," (2 ) number of good eggs destroyed? (g), hav ing instances "zero," "one," and "f i ve," and ( 3 ) saucer to wash? ( s), having instances "no" and "yes." That is, every realization corresponds to an assignment of an instance to each chance variable.
We call the variables describing a set of alternatives de cision variables (o r decisions, for short ). For example, suppose we have a set of alternatives about how we are going to dress for work. In this case, we can describe our alternatives in terms of the decision variables (s ay ) shirt ( " plain" or "striped" ), pants ( " je ans" or "cor duroy"), and shoes ( " tennis shoes" or "loafers"). In this example and in general, every alternative corre sponds to an assignment of an instance to each deci sion variable.
The description of possible states of the world in terms of component variables is a bit more complicated, and is not needed for our explication of unresponsiveness and limited unresponsiveness. We defer discussion of this issue to Section 4.1.
As a matter of notation, we use D to denote the set of decisions that describe the alternatives for a deci sion problem, and lower-case letters ( e .g ., d, e, f) to denote individual decisions in the set D. Also, we use U to denote the set of chance variables that describe the realizations, and lower-case letters (e .g., x, y, z ) to denote individual chance variables in U. In addition, we use the variable S to denote the state of the world (t he instances of S correspond to the possible states of the world).4 Thus, any given decision problem-or domain, as we sometimes call it-is described by the variables U, D, and S.5
With this introduction, we can discuss the concept of limited unresponsiveness. To illustrate this concept, consider the following decision problem adapted from Rubin (1978) . Suppose we are a physician who has to decide whether or not to recommend a treatment to a 3To emphasize the distinction between chance and de cision variables, we put a question mark at the end of the names of chance variables.
4We use an uppercase "S" to denote this single variable, because later we decompose S into a set of variables.
5Sometimes, for simplicity, we leave s implicit in the specification of a decision problem.
patient. Given our recommendation, the patient may or may not actually accept the treatment, and may or may not be cured as a result. Here, we use a sin gle decision variable recommendation (r) to represent our alternatives (i .e ., D = { r}) , and two chance vari ables taken? (t) and cured? (c) to represent whether or not the patient actually accepts the treatment and whether or not the patient is cured, respectively (i .e ., U={t, c}).
The possible states of the world for this problem are shown in Table 3 . For example, consider the first row in the table. Here, the patient will accept the treat ment if and only if we recommend it, and will be cured if and only if he takes the treatment. We describe this state by saying that the patient is a "complier" and is "helped" by the treatment. We discuss the description of these states in more detail in Section 4 .1.
As indicated in the table, we have asserted that the last four states of the world are impossible (i .e., have a probability of zero). These last four states share the property that t takes on the same instance for both alternatives, whereas c does not. Thus, this decision problem satisfies the following property: in all of the states of the world that are possible, if t is the same for the two alternatives, then c is also the same. We say that c is unresponsive to r in states limited by t.
In general, suppose we have a decision problem de scribed by variables U, D, and S. Let X be a subset of U, andY be a subset of UUD. We say that X is unre sponsive to D in states limited by Y if we believe that, for all possible states of the world, if Y assumes the same instance for any two alternatives then X must also assume the same instance for those alternatives.
To be more formal, let X[ S, D] be the instance that X assumes (w ith certainty) given the state of the world S and the alternative D. For example, in the omelet story, if S is the state of the world where the egg is good, and D is the alternative "throw away," then o[S , D) (t he number of eggs in the omelet ) assumes the instance "five." Then, we have the following definition.
Definition 1 (Limited (Un)responsiveness) Given a decision problem described by chance variables U, decision variables D, and state of the worldS, and variable sets X � U and Y � D U U, X is said to be unresponsive to D in states limited by Y, denoted
X is said to be responsive to D in states limited by Y, denoted X f->y D, if it is not the case that X is unresponsive to D in states limited by Y. That is, if we believe that 3 S E S, Dt ED, D2 ED such that
When X is ( u n)responsive to D in states limited by Y = 0, we simply say that X is (un)responsive to D.
The notion of unresponsiveness is significantly simpler than that of limited unresponsiveness. In particular, when Y = 0, the equalities on the left -hand-side of the implications in De finition 1 are trivially satisfied. Thus, X is unresponsive to D if we believe that, for all possible states of the world and all alternatives, X assumes the same instance; and X is responsive to D, if there is some possible state of the world where X di ff ers for two di ff erent alternatives.
As examples of responsive variables, consider the omelet story. Let S denote the state where the egg is good, and D1 and D2 denote the alternatives "break into bowl" and "throw away," respectively. Then, for the variable o (number of eggs in omelet?) , we have
In a similar manner, we can con clude that g (number of good eggs destroyed?) , and s (saucer to wash?) are each responsive to D as well.
Note that, if an chance variable x is responsive to D, then-to some degree-it is under the control of the decision maker. Consequently, the decision maker can not observe x prior to choosing an alternative for D.
For example, in the omelet story, we can not observe any of the responsive variables o, g, or s before choos ing an alternative .
As an example of an unresponsive variable, suppose we addS ( t he state of the world) as a variable to U. (E.g., in the omelet story, we can take U to be { S, o, g, s}.) By Savage's definition of S, it must be unresponsive to D. Note that adding S to U creates no new states of the world.
The notions of unresponsiveness and limited unrespon siveness are closely related to concepts in counterfac tual reasoning ( e .g., as described by Lewis (1 979)). In particular, when we determine whether or not a set of chance variables X is unresponsive to decisions D, we essentially answer the query "Will the outcome of X be the same no matter how we choose D?" Further more, when we determine whether or not X is unre sponsive to D in states limited by Y, we answer the query "Will the outcome of X be the same no matter how we choose D, if Y will not change as a result of our choice?" Queries of this form are of examples counter factual queries. On e of the fundamental assumptions of our work presented here is that these queries are eas ily answered. In our experience, we have found that decision makers are indeed comfortable answering such restricted counterfactual queries.
The concepts of responsiveness and probabilistic inde pendence are related, as illustrated by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 If a set of chance variables X is unre sponsive to a set of decision variables D, then X is Proof: By definition of unresponsiveness, X assumes the same instance for all alternatives in any possible state of the world. Consequently, we can learn about X by observing S, but not by observing D. 0
Nonetheless, the two concepts are not identical. In particular, the converse of Theorem 1 does not hold. For example, let us consider the simple decision of whether to bet heads or tails on the outcome of a coin flip. Assume that the coin is fair ( i.e., the probabilities of heads and tails are both 1/2) and that the person who flips the coin does not know our bet. Here, the possible outcomes of the coin toss correspond to the possible states of the world. Further, let decision vari able b denote our bet, and chance variable w describe the possible realizations that we win or not. In this sit uation, w is responsive to b, because for both possible states of the world, w will be di ff erent for the di ff erent bets. Nonetheless, the probability of w is 1/2, whether we bet heads or tails. That is, w and b are probabilis tically independent.
Limited unresponsiveness and conditional indepen dence are less closely related than are their unqual ified counterparts. Namely, limited unresponsiveness does not imply conditional independence. For exam ple, in the medical-treatment story, c (cured?) is un responsive to r (recommendation) in states limited by t (taken?), but it is reasonable for us to believe that c and r are not independent given t, perhaps because there is some gene that-partially or completely determines how a person reacts to both recommen dations and treatment. The proofs of these properties are straightforward. For example, consider property 5. Given X foyuz D, we have V S E S, Dt ED , D2 ED ,
That is, X foz D.
Ot her properties follow from these. In a second generalization, we can def i ne what it means for a set of chance variables to be unresponsive to a subset of all of the decisions. In particular, given a domain described by U and D, we say that X � U is unresponsive to D' � D in worlds limited by Y if X �Yu(D\D') D.
Finally, we can have combinations of these two gen eralizations. Nonetheless, except for a brief mention of each generalization, we do not pursue them in the remainder of the paper for the sake of simplicity.
3

Definition of Cause
Armed with the primitive notion of limited unrespon siveness, we can now formalize our definition of cause.
Definition 2 (Causes with Respect to Decisions) Given a decision problem described by U and D, and a variable x E U, the variables C � D U U \ { x} are said to be causes for x with respect to D if C is a minimal set of variables such that x �c D.
In our framework, decision variables cannot be caused, because they are under the control of the decision maker. Consequently, we define causes for chance vari ables only. The def i nition says that if we can f i nd set of variables Y such that, for all possible states of the world, x can be di ff erent for di ff erent alternatives only when Y is di ff erent, then Y must contain a set of causes for x. Ou r def i nition of cause departs from traditional usage of the term in that we consider causal relation ships relative to a set of decisions. Nonetheless, we f i nd this departure has an important advantage, which we discuss shortly.
As an example of our def i nition, consider the decision to continue or quit smoking, described by the deci sion variable s (smoke) and the chance variable l (lung cancer?) . If we believe that s and l are probabilisti cally dependent, then, by Theorem 1, it must be that l f-' s. Furthermore, by Property 3, we know that l f-', s. Consequently, by De finition 2, we have that s is a cause of l with respect to s.
Several consequences of De finition 2 are worth men tioning. First, although cause is irreflexive by def i ni tion, it is not always asymmetric. For example, in our story about the coin toss, consider another variable m that represents whether or not the outcome of the coin toss matches our bet b. In the story as we have told it, m is a deterministic function of w (win?) , and vice versa . Consequently, we have w �m b and m f-'w b; and so m is a cause of w and w is cause of m with re spect to b. Note that any hint of uncertainty destroys this symmetry. For example, if there is a possibility that the person tossing the coin will cheat (s o that we may lose even if we match ), then we can conclude that m is a cause of w, but not vice versa .
Second, cause is transitive for single variables. In par ticular, if x is a cause for y and y is a cause for z with respect to D, then z f-' D and ( b y the transitivity of unresponsiveness ) z �x D. Consequently, xis a cause for z with respect to D. Note that transitivity does not necessarily hold for causes containing sets of vari ables, because the minimality condition in De finition 2 may not be satisf i ed.
Third, C = 0 is a set of causes for x with respect to D if and only if x is unresponsive to D.
Finally, we have the following theorem, which follows from De f i nition 2 and several of the properties of lim ited unresponsiveness given in Section 2.
Theorem 2 Given any x E U, if C is a set of causes fo r x with respect to D, and wE C n U, then w must be responsive to D.
Proof: For any chance variable w E C, let C' = C \ { w}. By the minimality condition in our def i nition, we have
Suppose that w �D. Then, by Property 4, we have
Applying Equations 1 and 2 to Property 6, we have that x f-'c D, which contradicts that C is a set of causes for x with respect to D. 0
Let us consider another example of our definition that illustrates an advantage of defining cause with respect to the set of decisions. In the medical-treatment story, we have that c (cured?) is responsive to r ( recommen dation), because ( a mong other reasons ) in the first row in Table 3 , the patient is cured if and only if we rec ommend the treatment. Furthermore, as we discussed in the previous section, c is unresponsive to r in states limited by t (taken?). Consequently, we have that t is a cause of c with respect to r. Now, let us extend this example by imagining that there is some gene that aff ects how a person reacts to both our recommendation and to therapy. In this situ ation, it is reasonable for us to assert that the variable g (genotype?) is unresponsive to r. Thus, by Theo rem 2, g cannot be among the causes for any other variable. Someday, however, it may be possible to use retroviral therapy to alter one's genetic makeup. Given an additional decision variable v ( retroviral ther apy) , it is reasonable for us to assert that tis responsive to D = { r, v} in states limited by r, but unresponsive to D in states limited by { r, g}. In this case, we can conclude that { r, g} is a cause for t with respect to D. In addition, we can conclude that { t, g} is a cause for c with respect to D.
Thus, an advantage of defining cause with respect to the set of decisions is that we do not have to attach a causal explanation to dependencies between a vari able x and other variables, when we can do nothing to change x. In our example, g, t, and c are prob abilistically dependent. Nonetheless, if we cannot do anything to aff ect genotype, then there is little point in determining whether or not genotype causes treat ment and cure; and it is precisely in this case that our def i nition says it is OK to ignore such questions of cause.
Of course, we sometimes want to be able to assert the existence or nonexistence of causal dependencies out side of a real decision setting. Ou r definition does not preclude the ability to make such assertions. Namely, there is no reason to require that the decisions D be implementable in practice or at all. If we want to think about whether or not the patient's genotype is a cause for his cure, then we can imagine the retroviral-therapy decision that aff ects genotype regardless of the avail ability of the therapy. As another example, if we want to discuss the possibility that gender causes breast can cer, then we can imagine a decision that changes one's gender.
Finally, we can generalize our definition of what it means for a set of variables to cause x to a defini tion of what it means for a set of instances to cause x. Namely, we say that instance C of variables C is a cause for x � C with respect to D if C is a minimal set of variables such that x is unresponsive to D in states limited ' by C = C. That is, the instance C of C is a cause for x with respect to D if we replace our definition of cause with the weaker requirement that x be unresponsive to D in states limited by C = C. Again, for the sake of simplicity, we do not pursue this generalization in the remainder of the paper. 
Graphical Representation of Cause
Given the known benefits of the Bayesian network for representing conditional independence, we would like a graphical representation of cause and eff ect. The rep resentation we describe is a special case of an in fl uence diagram. An influence diagram for a decision prob lem described by U and D is a model for that prob lem having a structural component and a probabilistic component. The structure of an in fluence diagram is a directed acyclic graph containing (s quare ) decision and (o val ) chance nodes corresponding to decision and chance variables, respectively, as well as information and relevance arcs. Information arcs, which point to decision nodes, represent what is known at the time decisions are made. Relevance arcs, which point to chance nodes, represent ( b y their absence ) assertions of conditional independence. Namely, for some order ing of the variables, each variable x is probabilistically independent of all preceding variables given the par ents of x. Associated with each chance node x in an inf l uence diagram are probability distributions that, when combined with the assertions of conditional in dependence encoded in the structural component, de termine the joint probability distribution for U given D. A special kind of chance node is the determin istic node (d epicted as a double oval ). A node x is a deterministic node if its corresponding variable is a deterministic function of its parents. Also, an inf l u ence diagram may contain a single distinguished node, called a utility node that encodes the decision maker's utility for each state of the node's parents. A utility node is a deterministic function of its predecessors and can have no children. Finally, for an in flu ence diagram to be well formed, its decisions must be totally ordered by the inf l uence-diagram structure. (For more details, see Howard [1981] .)
In this paper, we concern ourselves neither with the or dering of decision nodes nor the observation of chance variables before making decisions. Therefore, we have no need for information arcs. In addition, although our new concepts apply to models that include a util ity node, we do not examine such models, as we can illustrate these concepts with models containing only chance, deterministic, and decision variables. An in flu ence diagram (w ithout information arcs or a utility node ) for the medical-treatment problem is shown in Figure 1a .
In Heckerman and Shachter (1994 ), we showed that an ordinary inf l uence diagram is an inadequate represen tation of causal dependence. In this section, we dis cuss a particular kind of an in fl u ence diagram, known as an inf l uence diagram in canonical form, that can accurately represent causal relationships.
Mapping Variables and Causal Mechanisms
Before we can describe canonical form, we need to in troduce the concept of a mapping variable. To under stand the concept of a mapping variable, let us reexam- In general, given a domain described by U, D, and S, a set of decision variables Y � D, and a set of chance variables X � U, the mapping variable X (Y) is a vari able that represents the possible mappings from Y to X. Rubin (1978) and Howard (1990) define concepts similar to the mapping variable.
As an example, consider the medical-treatment story. The mapping variable t(r) represents the possible mappings from the decision variable r ( recommenda tion) to the chance variable t (taken?). In this exam ple, the instances of t ( r ), shown in Table 4 , have a nat ural interpretation. In particular, the instance where the patient accepts treatment if and only if we recom mend it represents a patient who "complies" with our recommendation ; the instance where the patient ac cepts treatment if and only if we recommend against it represents a patient who "def i es" our recommenda tion ; and so on.
An important property concerning mapping variables is that, given variables X, Y, and X(Y), we can always write X as a deterministic function of Y and X (Y). For example, t is a deterministic function of r and t ( r) ; and, more generally, U is a deterministic function of D and U(D):: S.
In the discussions that follow, it is important to extend the definition of a mapping variable to include chance variables as arguments. Do ing so allows us to decom pose the monolithic mapping variable U(D) = S for a domain into a set of variables. For example, consider the medical-treatment story. Given this extension of the mapping-variable definition, we can def i ne the mapping variable c(t) with instances "helped," "hurt," "always cured," and "never cured." Together, the mapping variables t(r) and c(t) describe the possible states of the world U(D) = S. (E.g., t(r) ="complier" and c(t) ="helped" corresponds to state 1 in Ta ble 3.) As we shall see, this decomposition facilitates the graphical representation of causal relationships.
The extension of the mapping-variable definition to include chance variables as arguments is a bit tricky. For example, when the patient is an "always taker", it is impossible to distinguish between the instances "helped" and "always cured" of c(t), because for both recommendations, the patient will accept the treat ment. In this sense, the variable c(t) is not well de f i ned.
We can overcome this problem by imagining a decision that allows us to directly set t to any of its instances, regardless of the recommendation decision. The key idea in setting this variable directly is that we force t to take on a particular instance without changing the instances of any other variables except those that are mandated by the known causal relationships in the do main. For example, assuming the treatment is a drug and that there is no placebo eff ect, we can directly set t to "taken" by injecting the patient with the drug with out his knowledge. In contrast, although we can set t to "taken" by physically forcing the patient to take the drug, this operation may not qualify as a setting of the variable if the patient's conditioned is worsened by the use of force itself.
Pearl and Verma (1991) and Spirtes et al. (1993) dis cuss the notion of directly setting or manipulating a variable, taking this concept to be primitive. Here, we formally define the notion in terms of limited un responsiveness.
Definition 3 (Set Decision) Given a domain de scribed by U, D, and S, consider a set of decision variables outside D, denoted (;, that contains one de cision variable x fo r every x E U, where x has alter natives "set x to k" fo r each possible instance k of x and "do nothing. " Let U' = U, D' = D U (;, and S' be an augmentation of the original domain in the sense that, ( 1) when each x E (; is set to "do nothing", the realizations in the augmented domain (as a fu nction of S' and D') are the same as those in the original domain, and (2) when x ="set x to k, " then x as sumes tlie state k. Then, (; is said to be a collection of set decision variables for U with respect to U, D, For example, in the medical-treatment story, we have that c �t r. Thus, in the augmented domain, we must have c �t { r, i} for i to be a set decision for t. It is likely that a decision to secretly in ject the patient satisfies this condition ( again, provided there is no placebo eff ect ), whereas it is unlikely that a decision to use physical force does. Note that, in general, set decisions need only be hypothesized. They need not be implementable in practice.
Definition 4 (Setting a Variable) Given a deci sion variable d, we set that variable by choosing one of its alternatives. Given a chance variable x, we set that variable by choosing one of the alternatives of x other than "do nothing. "
We can now give the general def i ntion of a mapping variable.
Definition 5 (Mapping Variable) Given chance variables X and variables Y, the map ping variable X (Y) is the chance variable that repre sents all possible mappings from Y to X as we set Y to each of its possible instances. 7
There are several important points to be made about mapping variables as we have now defined them. First, as in the more specific case, X is always a deterministic function of Y and X (Y).
Second, additional probability assessments typically are required when introducing a mapping variable into a probabilistic model. For example, two independent assessments are needed to quantify the relationship be tween r and t in the medical-treatment story; whereas three independent assessments are required for the node t(r). In general, many additional assessments are required. If X has b instances and Y has a in stances, then X(Y) has as many as ba instances. In real-world domains, however, reasonable assertions of independence decrease the number of required assess ments. In some cases, no additional assessments are necessary (see, e.g., Heckerman et al. 1994 ).
Third, although we may not be able to observe a map ping variable directly, we may be able to learn some thing about it. For example, we can model the decision to continue or quit smoking using the decision vari able s (smoke) , the chance variable l (lung cancer?) , and the mapping variable l ( s). Although we cannot observe l(s), we can imagine a test that measures the susceptibility of someone's lung tissue to lung cancer in the presence of tobacco smoke. Given the result of such a test, we can update our probability distribution over l(s).
Fourth, we have the following theorem and corollaries. Corollary 5 (Cause) Given a decision problem de scribed by U and D, and a chance variable x E U, the variables C � D U U \ { x} are causes for x with re spect to D if C is a minimal set of variables such that
We can think of x (C)-where Care causes for x-as a causal mechanism that relates C and x. For example, suppose chance variables i and o represent the volt age input and output, respectively, of an inverter in a logic circuit. Given a decision d to which i responds, we can assert that { i} is a cause for o. In this exam ple, the mapping variable o( i), represents the mapping from the inverter's inputs to its outputs. That is, this mapping variable represents the state of the inverter itself.
Definition 6 (Causal Mechanism) Given a deci sion problem described by U and D and a chance vari able x E U that is responsive to D, a causal mech anism for x with respect to D is a mapping variable x (C) where C are causes for x with respect to D.
Thus, we have the following consequence of Corol lary 4.
Corollary 6 (Causal Mechanism) If x (C) is a causal mechanism for x with respect to D, then x (C) is unresponsive to D.
Canonical Form Influence Diagrams
We can now define what it means for an influence di agram to be in canonical form. are responsive to D are descendants of one or more de cision nodes and (2) all chance nodes that are descen dants of one or more decision nodes are deterministic nodes.
An immediate consequence of this definition is that any chance node that is not a descendant of decision node must be unresponsive to D.
We can construct an influence diagram in canonical form for a given problem by including in the influence diagram a causal mechanism for every variable that is responsive to the decisions. In doing so, we can make every responsive variable a deterministic function of a set of its causes and the unresponsive causal mech anism. For example, consider the medical-treatment story as depicted in the influence diagram of Figure la . The variables t and care responsive tor, but their cor responding nodes are not deterministic. Consequently, this influence diagram is not in canonical form. To construct a canonical form influence diagram, we in troduce the mapping variables t(r) and c(t), as shown in Figure lb . The responsive variables are now deter ministic; and the mapping variables are unresponsive to the decision. This example illustrates an important point: Causal mechanisms may be probabilistically de pendent. We return to this issue in Section 4.3.
In general, we can construct an influence diagram in canonical form for the decision problem U and D as follows.
Algorithm 1 (Canonical Form)
1. Add a node to the diagram corresponding to each variable in U U D 2. Order the variables x1, .. . , Xn in U so that the variables unresponsive to D come first 3. Fo r each variable x; E U that is unresponsive to D, (a) Add a causal-mechanism chance node x; ( C;) to the diagram, where C; � D U {x1, ... , x;_I} (b) Make x; a deterministic node with parents C; and x;(C;)
4. Assess dependencies among the variables that are unresponsive to D This algorithm is well defined. In particular, it is al ways possible to find a C; satisfying the condition in step 3a, because x; � D D by Property 3.
Also, the structure of the of the constructed influence diagram is valid. Namely, by Corollary 6, all causal mechanisms added in step 3 are unresponsive to D. Thus, suppose we identify the relevance arcs and de terministic nodes by using a variable ordering where the nodes in D are followed by the unresponsive nodes ( including the causal mechanisms ), which are in turn followed by the responsive nodes in the order specified at step 2. Then, ( 1 ) we would add no arcs from D to the unresponsive nodes by Theorem 1 (and the algo rithm adds none ) ; (2 ) we would add arcs among the unresponsive nodes as described in step 4; and ( 3 ) for every responsive variable x;, we would make x; a de terministic node ( as described in step 3b ) by definition of a mapping variable.
Furthermore, the structure that results from Algo rithm 1 will be in canonical form. In particular, be cause there are no arcs from D to the unresponsive nodes, only responsive variables can be descendants of D. In addition, by Theorem 2, we know that every responsive node is a descendant of D, and ( by con struction ) a deterministic node.
To illustrate the algorithm, consider the medical treatment story as depicted by the influence diagram in Figure 2a where the variable g (genotype?) is rep resented explicitly. To construct an influence diagram in canonical form for this problem, we first add the variables { r, g, t, c} to the diagram and choose the or dering (g, t, c) . Both t and c are responsive to D = { r }, and have causes r and t, respectively. Consequently, we add causal mechanisms t(r) and c(t) to the new diagram, and make t a deterministic function of rand t ( r) and c a deterministic function of t and c( t). Fi nally, we assess the dependencies among the unrespon sive variables {g, t(r) , c(t)}, adding arcs from g to t(r) and c(t) under the assumption that the causal mech anisms are conditionally independent given g. The resulting canonical form influence diagram is shown in Figure 2b .
From our construction, it follows that every responsive variable x; has at least one set of causes explicitly en coded in the diagram ( C;). That is, a canonical form influence diagram constructed as in Algorithm 1 ac curately represents a set of causes for every variable having a nonempty set of causes. In this sense, we f i nd canonical form to be an adequate representation of cause.
Canonical form is a generalization of Howard Canon ical Form, which was developed by Howard (1990) to facilitate the computation of value of information.
Pearl's Causal Theory
There is a close relationship between the canoni cal form influence diagram and Pearl's causal theory (Pearl and Verma, 1991; Pearl, 1995) . In fact, as we now demonstrate, a causal theory is a special case of canonical form.8
Pearl takes causation to be a primitive notion, and de fines a causal model for variables U to be a directed acyclic graph where each node corresponds to a vari able in U and each nonroot node is caused by its par ents. Each variable in his analysis plays a dual role of chance and decision variable. In particular, a vari able may be observed or directly set to a particular instance. As mentioned, Pearl takes the concept of directly setting a variable to be a primitive. Given a causal model for U, Pearl goes on to define a causal theory for U. Here, we express his definition in the language of influence diagrams. Let M(U) be a causal model for U. Let Pa(x) denote the parents of x in M(U), which by def i nition are causes for x. A causal theory fo r U based on M(U), which we denote T(U), is an influence diagram described as follows. For each variable x; E U, i = 1, ... , n, T(U) contains a corresponding chance variable x;, a set decision i; for X;, and a chance variable f;, which Pearl calls a distur bance variable. Furthermore, in the inf l uence diagram T(U), only the chance nodes x; have parents. In par ticular, each x; is a deterministic function of Pa(x;), i;, and Ei, where (1) if i; = k then x; = k, and (2 ) if i; ="do nothing" then x = f;[Pa (x;), E;] for some deterministic function J;. Note that, in a causal the ory, disturbance variables are mutually independent by definition. Now, in our framework, suppose we have a set of chance variables U and a corresponding collection of set decisions 0 for U with respect to U. In addi tion, suppose that, for all x;, Pa(x;.) U {i;.} is a set of causes for x; with respect to 0. When we con struct an influence diagram in canonical form as de scribed in Algorithm 1 using an ordering consistent with the causal model M ( U) , we can obtain an influ ence diagram where each variable x; is a determinis tic function of i;, Pa(x;), and the causal mechanism x;(Pa(x;) , i;). Given the def i nition of a set decision, we can simplify each such relationship by writing x; as a deterministic function of i;, Pa( x;) , and the variable x;(Pa(x;)), where x;(Pa(x;)) represents the possible mappings from Pa(x;) to x; when i; is set to "do noth ing." If we identify each mapping variable x;(Pa(x;)) with Pearl's disturbance variable f;, then we obtain an influence diagram identical to the causal theory T(U), with the exception that the mapping variables in this influence diagram may be dependent.9
The fact that disturbance variables must be indepen dent in a causal theory does not necessarily limit the expressiveness of a causal theory. Such dependencies often disappear when hidden common causes are in troduced. Furthermore, the assumption that causal mechanisms are independent has the convenient con sequence that the a causal model for U can be inter preted as a Bayesian network in the traditional sense (Spirtes et al., 1993; Pearl, 1995) . That is, if variables X and Y are d-separated by Z in the causal model, then X and Y are conditionally independent given Z according to the causal theory.
Nonetheless, the fact that we can use canonical form to represent causes locally-that is, we represent causes only when they are relevant to the decisions at hand makes canonical form a more efficient representation than the causal theory. For example, to represent the relationships in Figure 2b using a causal theory, we would introduce causal-mechanism variables t( r, g) and c( t, g). Assuming r, g, t and c are binary variables, bot h ma pping va ri ables in the caus al th eory wo ul d ha ve 16 inst ances. In contr ast, bot h ma pping va ri ab les in Fig ure 2b ha ve only fo ur inst ances. Conse quently, th e nodes g, t(r, g ) an d c(t, g ) in the caus al-t heory rep resent ation re quire 31 prob abilities in tot al, whereas the nodes g, c(s), an d v(d) in the ca nonic al-form rep resent at ion re quire only 13 prob abilities in tot al .
5
Conclusions and Future Wo rk
We have presented a precise definition of caus e an d eff ect in terms of th e more fund ament al notion of un responsiveness. Our definition dep arts fr om th e tr adi tion al view of caus at ion in th at ou r caus al assertions ar e ma de rel ative to a set of decisions. As a conse quence, ou r definition al lows fo r models where only some dependencies ha ve a causa l expl an at ion. We ha ve sh own how th ese properties ca n ma ke th e represen ta tion an d ma nip ul at ion of caus al rel ations hi ps more efficient.
In ad dition, we ha ve ex amined th e gr aphic al encod ing of caus ation. We ha ve sh own ho w the ordin ary infl uence di agr am is in ad equate as a gr ap hi c al repre sent ation of caus e, bu t that th e ca nonic al fo rm infl u ence di ag ra m is al wa ys an ac cu ra te la ng uage fo r caus al dependence. Also, we ha ve described th e rel ations hi p between Pe arl's caus al th eory an d ca nonic al fo rm in fluence di ag ra ms.
An import an t as pect of caus ality that we ha ve ba rely to uc he d up on in th is pa per is th e notion of time . For ex ample, wh at if ou r al tern atives consists of reactive plans, where observ ations ar e interspersed wit h ac tions ? Mo re gener al ly, wh at ha ppens wh en system va ri ab les ch ange in time ? We will explore these iss ues an d others in a se quel to this pa per.
